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ABSTRACT ■ This article uses psychological contract theory to explore the
consequences of job insecurity among union members. We hypothesize that
the perception of job insecurity will correlate with a lower level of perceived
union support and a higher intention to resign union membership. We also test
whether the relationship between job insecurity and membership turnover is
mediated by (a lack of) perceived union support. In Belgium, Italy and the
Netherlands, an association is found between job insecurity and a reduction in
perceived union support, and between job insecurity and the intention to resign
membership; this association is also fully mediated by (a lack of) perceived
union support. None of these hypotheses are corroborated in Sweden. We 
discuss implications of these findings for future research and for unions in
Europe.
KEYWORDS: European study ■ intention to resign membership ■ job 
insecurity ■ psychological contract ■ union membership ■ union support 
Introduction
The last decades have been marked by important organizational changes,
with large-scale restructuring, mergers, downsizing and plant closings
often accompanied by massive staff dismissals. The number of temporary
employees has also shown a significant increase. Thus employees have felt
more insecure.
The concept of ‘job insecurity’ can be defined as the ‘subjectively
perceived likelihood of involuntary job loss’ (Sverke et al., 2002). The
same objective situation, such as a decline in company orders, may be
interpreted in different ways, provoking feelings of insecurity for some
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workers, even if their job continuity is (‘objectively speaking’) not at
stake. Others, on the contrary, may feel particularly secure about their jobs,
even though they may be dismissed soon afterwards. What typifies this
subjective conceptualization of job insecurity is that it concerns insecurity
about the future: for the employees concerned, there is uncertainty about
retaining their jobs or eventually facing a lay-off (De Witte, 1999). Em-
ployees who feel uncertain cannot always adequately prepare themselves
for the future. Many definitions also refer to the involuntary nature of job
insecurity (Sverke and Hellgren, 2002). Research on job insecurity does
not focus on employees who deliberately choose, for example, a tem-
porary contract, because it suits their present situation. Insecure em-
ployees rather experience a discrepancy between the preferred and the
perceived level of security offered by their employer. A feeling of power-
lessness is also emphasized in many definitions (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt,
1984). Job insecurity mostly implies feelings of helplessness in preserving
the desired continuity of employment.
During the past decades, extensive research has been reported on the
effects of job insecurity. It decreases the health and well-being of indi-
vidual employees and also influences various organizational attitudes and
behaviours, thus also affecting the organization (De Witte, 2005a). The
perception of job insecurity is frequently linked to reduced organiza-
tional commitment (Ashford et al., 1989).
Research on the effects of job insecurity has focused almost exclusively
on consequences for the individual employee and the company. Much
less attention is paid to the effects of job insecurity on trade unions and
on union participation. These effects are the focus of this article. Using
data from four European countries, we examine the association of job
insecurity with perceived union support and, conversely, the intention to
resign membership. We concentrate on union members, since the inten-
tion to resign membership can only be analyzed among the latter. First,
we focus on union membership, and discuss the motives for becoming
(and remaining) a union member. Next, our theoretical perspective
(psychological contract theory) and hypotheses are outlined.
(Motives for) Union Membership
Union participation is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. Klandermans
(1997) identified two dimensions: intensity and duration. Participation may
require minimal or considerable effort (intensity), whereas it may also be
one-off or of indefinite duration. In principle, union membership is durable
(for an indefinite time), and requires only limited effort from the individual.
Such passive participation contrasts with activities of greater intensity, such
as participating in strikes or taking up a position as an active union member.
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In this article, we concentrate on union membership. The choice for
this ‘basic form’ of union participation is obvious. Unions depend on
their members for their continuity, whereas membership numbers also
constitute their power base (Barling et al., 1992). Having a large number
of members strengthens a union’s bargaining position, because more
employees can be mobilized for collective action (Klandermans, 1997).
This suggests that, for the individual member, union membership also
represents the ‘necessary’ (but insufficient) first step to a more active
form of union participation, which demands more energy and dedication
(e.g. participation in industrial action). For the labour movement, it is
thus crucial to find out whether there is an association between job
insecurity and union membership, since a change (rise or fall) in the
number of members as a consequence of job insecurity has important
implications for the future of the union movement.
Research into the motives of individuals for becoming a union
member often uses the classification developed by Van De Vall (1970),
who distinguishes between ideological motives (e.g. ‘To make the union
as strong as possible’), social motives (pressure from colleagues or
family members) and instrumental motives (financial, legal and admin-
istrative support or protection in case of difficulties). European research
shows the instrumental motive to be the most important motivation for
union membership (Waddington and Hoffman, 2000). In Flanders
(Belgium), 69 percent of union members joined ‘because being a mem-
ber is good protection in the event of problems at work’ (De Witte,
1996: 281). The predominance of the instrumental or ‘protection
motive’ suggests that the union is considered by many members as an
‘insurance’ against possible problems in the individual or collective
sphere (Visser, 1995).
The need for protection which is central to the instrumental
motivation of membership of course includes more than just protection
against possible dismissal or job insecurity. The latter, however, consti-
tutes an important component of the protection motive. In research in
Flanders, 32 percent of union members explicitly referred to job security
as a reason for becoming a member (De Witte, 1996). Principal com-
ponents analysis also shows this motive to be part of the ‘instrumental
motives’ dimension. Quite similar findings emerge from research in
other countries, also showing that members highly prioritize job insecurity
as a reason why union protection is necessary (Dworkin et al., 1988;
Guest and Dewe, 1988). Visser (1995) concludes that the threat of
unemployment has motivated many employees to take the precaution of
becoming or remaining a union member. Conversely, former members
often refer to a lack of protection, or to the fact that they no longer need
this protection, as a motive for resigning their membership
(Klandermans, 1997).
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A Psychological Contract Perspective on 
Union Membership
The ‘protection motive’ offers a point of departure for developing
hypotheses concerning the association of job insecurity with union
attitudes and the intention to resign membership. This orientation towards
the union suggests an analogy between the employee–union and employee–
management relations. Both relationships seem to be based on a busi-
ness-like transaction: the employees contribute a cost (membership fee or
participative effort), against which the union or the company provides a
benefit (employment protection or income). Both relations may thus be
typified in terms of a rational cost–benefit analysis. The similarity in the
relations pertaining to the company and to union membership suggests
that some of the effects of job insecurity on attitudes to the company may
also hold true for attitudes and behaviour regarding the union.
In this article, we argue that the effects of job insecurity among union
members can be viewed from the perspective of the psychological contract
(Rousseau, 1995): the mutual expectations between employees and their
employer. The psychological contract is implicit, informal and subjective,
unlike the formal employment contract. The concept refers to an ex-
change between two parties; as a consequence, this ‘contract’ is mutual
and dynamic. Within the psychological contract, the idea of balance is
central: the employee needs to feel that what is offered by the organiza-
tion balances what the individual brings to the relationship, and a perceived
imbalance results in the perception of a violation of the contract. Such
a violation has negative effects (Robinson, 1996): in the short term,
a strong negative emotional response is evoked, directed towards the party
responsible for the violation. As a consequence, various organizational
attitudes (such as trust in the employer) become more negative. These
could result in negative behaviours in a later phase, such as an intention
to leave the organization, and actually doing so.
We can apply the concept of the psychological contract to the
relationship between the union member and union. Union members also
engage in an exchange relationship in which both parties develop
(implicit) mutual expectations. In this article, we only focus on union
members and their expectations. We argue that the expectation to be
protected from job insecurity forms one of the core elements in the
psychological contract between union members and their union, consist-
ent with the finding that members emphasize job security as one of the
key benefits of union membership (Dworkin et al., 1988). Our argument
is not that members expect their unions to safeguard them totally from
becoming unemployed, but rather that unions will ensure the highest
level of security possible in the circumstances. We expect that job inse-
curity disturbs the balance of the cost–benefit relation of members with
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their union, and will be perceived as a violation of the psychological con-
tract with the union. Membership is seen to offer insufficient protection
against insecurity, whereas the very reason they became union members
stemmed from the wish to be ‘protected’ against insecurity.
Violation of the Psychological Contract: Hypotheses
Since a violation of the psychological contract evokes negative emotional
responses, we can expect an impact on attitudes as well as behaviours.
The attitudes can be expected to precede the behavioural responses, since
a violation of the psychological contract first of all affects the loyalty of
members towards their union (Sverke and Goslinga, 2003). A reduction of
loyalty seems to reduce various attitudes, which in turn results in more
negative behaviours later on (Sverke et al., 2004). In this article, we will
focus on a specific attitude towards unions, which has not received much
attention in previous research: the extent to which people feel supported
by their union. We then discuss the intention to resign union membership.
The concept of ‘perceived union support’ is developed by analogy with
research in the context of companies (Shore et al., 1994). The central idea is
that, as a member, one is heard within the union when one has a question
or a problem. Using psychological contract theory, an association between
job insecurity and perceived union support seems obvious. For members,
the experience of job insecurity implies the violation of their psychological
contract with the union, since the expectation that their union will protect
them against insecurity has not been met. The experience of insecurity is
also at odds with their instrumental motivation. We hypothesize that this
leads to the perception that one is not supported by the union (H1).
Our second dependent variable is the intention to resign union
membership. Here again, the similarity with the intention to resign from
a job in an organizational context is apparent. It is justifiable to look at
intention rather than concrete turnover behaviour, because intention is
linked to future action, as suggested by the theory of planned behaviour
(Ajzen, 1985). Psychological contract theory leads to the hypothesis that
job insecurity is associated with a higher intention of resigning member-
ship (H2), because members perceive their psychological contract to be
violated. Union membership does not prove instrumental: people feel
threatened by unemployment, even though they wanted to ‘insure’ or
protect themselves against it by becoming a union member. As a conse-
quence, members become disappointed, and could start wondering
whether it is still beneficial to continue their membership. The increased
intention to resign membership could also reflect dissatisfaction with
inadequate union interest representation: the union offered insufficient
protection against insecurity.
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The inclusion of perceived union support and the intention to resign
membership in the same study enables us to answer an additional
research question. Research shows that attitudes (such as perceived union
support) often have an impact on the intention to resign (Barling et al.,
1992). The psychological contract perspective suggests that we can expect
job insecurity to have an autonomous influence on perceived union
support and on the intention to resign union membership. To test this
assumption, we will analyse whether job insecurity autonomously influ-
ences turnover intentions, once perceived union support has been controlled
for. The latter also allows testing of a final question. When discussing
reactions to a violation of the psychological contract, we mentioned that
more negative attitudes seem to precede an increase in turnover inten-
tions. Research also shows that attitudes towards unions predict behav-
iours, such as turnover (Barling et al., 1992; Goslinga and Klandermans,
2001). These findings thus suggest that the association between job inse-
curity and turnover intention could be mediated by perceived union
support. We will test this assumption, using the recommendations of
Baron and Kenny (1986).
Method
Design
This research is part of a broader, European comparative study on the
role of unions in mitigating the negative effects of job insecurity (Sverke
et al., 2004). Four European countries are involved in this project:
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. In these countries, we tried
to collect similar data on this topic. Because we partly use existing data
(secondary analysis), however, some variables are not operationalized in
exactly the same way (see later).
The selection of countries guarantees substantial heterogeneity of
union contexts. This suggests that the results of the analyses may be
meaningful within a broad European context. The almost complete range
of membership density is included in our design: the Netherlands has
relatively low density, 25–30 percent; Italy and Belgium are in the middle
range of 40–50 percent; Sweden has the highest European density, roughly
80 percent. In addition, there is variation as regards the integration of
labour unions into the social security system (Ferner and Hyman, 1998):
this is rather weak in the Netherlands but very strong in the other
countries. In this contribution, we are especially interested in the robust-
ness of our hypotheses: the main aim of the comparison between the four
countries or ‘union contexts’ is to examine to what extent results regarding
the various hypotheses may be generalized across different samples and
countries. With that objective, an attempt has been made to produce data
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as comparative as possible, even though this aim has probably not fully
been met (see later). The purpose of this analysis is not to provide a
specific explanation of differences between countries, although such
differences will also be discussed in the conclusion.
Samples
The Belgian data were collected in 1998 via a telephone survey in the
three parts of the country (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia). The survey
was aimed at employees from the private sector, in companies with at
least 50 employees. In total, 1487 employees were interviewed: a response
rate of 20 percent from those who could be reached by telephone and
fitted the criteria to be interviewed; 870 of these were members of a union.
They were on average 39 years old, and 59 percent of them were male. The
sample was heterogeneous with regard to social class and educational
level, and members from all unions were represented.
In Italy, data were collected in 2000. A random sample of 476 workers
responded to the questionnaire, mainly in small groups and at their
workplace (response rate: 55 percent); 296 were members of a union. The
average age was 41, and 67 percent were male. The sample was also
heterogeneous as far as social class and educational level are concerned.
In this case, respondents from the public sector were also included in the
sample, but 77.5 percent worked in the private sector.
In the Netherlands, the data were collected as part of the longitudinal
panel held amongst members of CNV. This is an ideologically distinctive
(Christian) union, with approximately 350,000 members – only about 30
percent of the size of the largest Dutch federation, the FNV. The telephone
survey in the Netherlands thus covered only union members. The data
were collected in 1998, with 896 participants (response rate: 52 percent).
Their average age was 46 and 75 percent were male. The sample is hetero-
geneous in terms of educational level. No questions were asked about
occupational position, but the CNV covers both public and private sectors.
The data in Sweden were collected in the course of 2000 by means of a
postal survey. The target group was blue-collar workers who were
members of the Swedish Municipal Workers Union (Kommunal),
affiliated to the main union confederation (LO). In total, 1923 members
returned completed questionnaires, a response rate of 75 percent. The
average age was 45, and 78 percent were women. The questionnaire
contained no questions on educational level.
Measures
All surveys contained questions on a number of background characteristics
such as gender and age. As indicated above, some of these were not present
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in every dataset. Several items were used to operationalize the dependent
variables. All items were scored on a five-point scale (‘1’  ‘disagree’ and
‘5’  ‘agree’). Principal components analysis was performed per country to
determine whether the various items referred to the expected dimension
(for detailed information, see Sverke et al., 2001). Subsequently, scales were
computed for each concept.
In Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, job insecurity was measured with
five items, three of which were derived from Ashford et al. (1989) and two
from De Witte (2000). These items refer to two dimensions of job inse-
curity: cognitive (‘I am sure that I can keep my job’, reverse scored), and
affective (‘I am worried about keeping my job’). A higher score on the scale
indicates more job insecurity. The scales are reliable: Cronbach alpha varies
between .79 and .91. In Belgium, job insecurity was measured with only
one item. Respondents had to answer: ‘How large, in your opinion, is the
probability that you will become unemployed in the near future?’ on a five-
point scale (‘1’  ‘extremely small or impossible’ and ‘5’  ‘very high’). In
previous research in Belgium, principal components analysis shows that
this (cognitive) item is part of the broader dimension of job insecurity, as
measured with five items in the remaining countries (De Witte, 2000).
In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, perceived union support was
measured with five items, derived from the scale of Shore et al. (1994).
Examples are: ‘I can always turn to my union with questions and problems’
and ‘My union appreciates my opinion’. A high score on the scale expresses
the perception of support from the union. The reliability of the scales was
limited in Italy (  .59) and rather moderate in Belgium (  .68) and
the Netherlands (  .71). In Sweden, only three items were available to
measure this concept, which did, however, prove to be reliable (  .79).
In each country, the intention to resign membership (‘membership
turnover intention’) was measured with one item, scored on a five-point
scale. In Italy and the Netherlands, respondents evaluated the item
‘I sometimes consider giving up my membership’. In Sweden, respondents
evaluated ‘I considered leaving my union during the past six months’. In
Belgium, the item was formulated slightly differently: ‘I would leave my
union if I had a good alternative’. Principal components analysis on
other datasets in Sweden and the Netherlands shows that these diverse
items are all manifestations of the same concept: the intention to give up
membership (Sverke et al., 2001).
Analysis
The hypotheses are tested by means of (OLS) regression analysis.
Respondents with no scores for one or more variables were excluded
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from the analysis (‘list-wise deletion’). This reduced the size of the
samples (N  463 in Belgium, 248 in Italy, 691 in the Netherlands and
1688 in Sweden). The large reduction in the Belgian sample is due to the
lack of information concerning the age of one third of the respondents.
The impact of this reduction is probably limited, since an analysis with pair-
wise deletion of missing values (instead of list-wise) reveals very similar
results When testing hypotheses, the available background characteristics
(gender and age) were controlled for. We limit the ‘control variables’ to
those present in all four datasets, in order to increase the comparability
of the results. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the following
conditions must be met in order to demonstrate mediation: job insecur-
ity and perceived union support must both predict turnover intentions,
job insecurity must predict perceived union support, and the association
between job insecurity and turnover intentions must decrease or disap-
pear once perceived union support is added to the analysis. We test all
conditions.
Results
Job Insecurity and Perceived Union Support
According to H1, job insecurity is associated with a reduction in (perceived)
union support. Table 1 contains the results of a regression analysis, with
perceived union support as criterion variable, and age, gender and job
insecurity as predictors.
The results show that in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, the
associations between job insecurity and perceived union support are signifi-
cant, when age and gender are kept under control. No significant job
insecurity contribution is observed in Sweden, however. H1 is thus con-
firmed in three countries, but rejected in Sweden. Note that the
coefficients of job insecurity are rather modest (ranging between .14
and .19). Table 1 equally shows that older people in Italy experience
reduced union support, whereas they feel slightly more supported in
Sweden. In three out of four countries, women score higher regarding per-
ceived union support. The three predictors together only explain a limited
part of the variance in perceived union support (see R2 in Table 1).
Job Insecurity and the Intention to Resign Membership
H2 states that union members’ experience of job insecurity is associated with
a higher intention to resign union membership. Table 2 contains the results
of a regression analysis to predict membership turnover intention on the
basis of age, gender and job insecurity (see step 2 regarding all countries).
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TABLE 1. Job Insecurity and Background Characteristics as Predictors of
Perceived Union Support
Standardized regression coefficients (Bêta)
Predictors Belgium Italy The Netherlands Sweden
Age .03 .16** .05 .05*
Gender .13** .13* .01 .10***
Job insecurity .15** .19** .14*** .02
F-value 6.25*** 7.80*** 5.26** 7.35***
d.f. (3, 472) (3, 249) (3, 691) (3, 1727)
R .19 .29 .15 .11
R2 .04 .09 .02 .01
* .05  p  .01; ** .01  p  .001; ***p  .001.
H2 is confirmed in three countries: Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.
As hypothesized, increased job insecurity is associated with a higher
intention to resign membership in these countries. Note that these asso-
ciations are again not very high, however (ranging between .10 and .15).
In Sweden H2 is rejected. One additional association with background
characteristics is observed: in Sweden women have a slightly lower
turnover intention. Also this time the explanatory power of the analysis
is limited, judging by the low R2 value at the bottom of Table 2.
To determine whether job insecurity has an autonomous effect on the
intention to resign membership, a third series of regression analyses was
performed. This time, perceived union support was introduced along
with the background characteristics (age and gender) and job insecurity
to predict membership turnover intention. Step 3 in Table 2 contains the
results of this analysis for each country.
After controlling for perceived union support (and background
characteristics), none of the coefficients of job insecurity are significant.
The significant coefficients of job insecurity in Belgium, Italy and the
Netherlands drop to an insignificant level, whereas the non-significant
coefficient in Sweden is unaltered after including perceived union
support in the analysis. This time, the explanatory power of the analysis
is slightly more substantial, as can be read from the R2 values at the
bottom of Table 2. This increase is due to the inclusion of perceptions of
union support in the analysis.
These results allow us to analyze whether the association between job
insecurity and turnover intentions is mediated by perceptions of union
support. In order to examine this issue, we first of all need to know
whether turnover intentions can be predicted on the basis of perceived
union support. The results of a separate analysis (not reported in Table 2)
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indeed show this to be the case in all countries. After controlling for age
and gender, perceived union support is significantly negatively related
to turnover intentions in Belgium (  .35, p  .001), Italy (  .39, 
p  .001), The Netherlands (  .25, p  .001) and Sweden (  .45,
p  .001). The results of step 3 in Table 2 show that the impact of job inse-
curity on turnover intentions is fully mediated by perceived union
support in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, since the significant-
coefficient of job insecurity in step 2 drops to an insignificant level after
the inclusion of union support in these three countries. In Sweden, no
mediation takes place, since the first condition for mediation was not
met: job insecurity was not associated with turnover intentions.
Summary and Discussion
This study has explored the consequences of job insecurity among union
members. Little previous research has been performed on the implications
of insecurity for unions and for union participation. One of the innovative
features of this study was the adoption of a psychological contract per-
spective. The dominant instrumental (or ‘insurance’) motive for becoming
a union member offered a point of departure: research in Europe shows
that employees mainly join unions to protect themselves, and protection
against job insecurity and dismissal is one of the components of this motiv-
ation. Members thus enter into a type of business transaction with their
union: in exchange for their financial contribution, the union must provide
protection and a sufficient level of security. This relationship was under-
stood in terms of a psychological contract between members and their
union, in which the idea of balance is central: the member needs to feel that
what he or she brings into the relation is balanced by what is being offered
by the union. We expect that the perception of job insecurity will be exper-
ienced by members as a violation of the psychological contract with their
union. As a consequence, we hypothesized that the perception of job
insecurity would correlate with a lower level of perceived union support,
and a higher intention to resign union membership. Our hypotheses were
tested by means of a secondary analysis of data from four European
countries: Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. The results support
our hypotheses in three out of four countries.
In three countries, affirmation was found for the hypothesis that job
insecurity is associated with a reduction of perceived union support, even
though the standardized regression coefficients were rather limited in
magnitude. The expected association between job insecurity and the
intention to resign membership was also found in the same three countries:
in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, union members showed a stronger
membership turnover intention when they felt insecure about their job.
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Finally, the results also suggested mediation of the relationship between
job insecurity and the intention to resign membership: in these three
countries, the association between job insecurity and turnover intentions
was fully mediated by perceived union support. This means that union
members in these countries were more inclined to resign their member-
ship once they experienced job insecurity, because they felt less supported
by their union. In Sweden, none of the hypotheses was corroborated.
The samples used to test our hypotheses were convenience samples
rather than samples representative of the total population of union mem-
bers in each country. Even though all samples were selected at random,
the target groups differed across samples. As a result, the composition of
the samples varied between the countries compared (e.g. there were
differences in the gender ratio, and some samples were limited to mem-
bers of a specific union, or a specific occupational group). The methods
of data collection differed too (telephone versus postal surveys), as well as
the response rates. Finally, measures differed between studies: in some
countries scales could be used, whereas in some other countries only
one-item versions of the relevant concepts were available. Sometimes,
even the formulation of a specific variable differed across countries. All
these differences obviously limit the comparability of our datasets and
results, and call for a replication of our findings in future research, using
identical samples and measures, and perhaps also more countries.
The methodological limitations of this study, however, can to a certain
extent also be regarded as an asset. It is striking after all, that our hypoth-
eses were all confirmed in three out of four countries, even though the
composition of the samples and the selection of measurements differed
between these countries. This heterogeneity in samples and measures
could be regarded as a more severe test of our theoretical assumptions.
The fact that similar results were found after testing our hypotheses in
varied conditions could perhaps indicate that our findings can be gener-
alized. Some caution is needed, however, before one can draw definite
conclusions. Future research will have to indicate whether our findings
can be truly generalized. Given the lack of international comparative
research on this issue, we suggest that the reported study already consti-
tutes a modest step forward, in order to analyse the impact of job
insecurity on union members.
One of the striking findings of this study relates to the position of
Sweden, where none of our hypotheses was corroborated. This could be
for methodological and/or institutional reasons. Of all samples involved,
the Swedish was the most homogeneous, since only blue-collar workers
from a single union were sampled. This homogeneity perhaps limited a
valid test of our hypotheses.
The rejection of our hypotheses in Sweden could however also relate to
distinctive national characteristics. The exceptionally high union density
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in Sweden not only means that the great majority of employees join a
union, but also that few union members consider resigning. The impact
of job insecurity on the intention to resign union membership is perhaps
more limited in a country which is in many respects an institutional
outlier, especially in comparison to the others in our study. Traxler (1998)
typifies industrial relations in these three latter countries as extension-
based bargaining regimes: while union density is low to average, bar-
gaining coverage is much higher because of legal extension of collective
agreements to non-unionized workers. So union membership is not a
requirement to benefit from collectively bargained employment advan-
tages and resigning union membership has little to no consequences on
employment conditions. In Sweden, this kind and level of legal regulation
is absent. Kjellberg (1992) describes the Swedish model of industrial
relations as centralized ‘self-regulation’: powerful, well-organized and
centrally coordinated interest organizations operate within a three-tier
system of collective bargaining with no mandatory incomes policies or
state intervention in collective bargaining as long as the labour market
parties behave responsibly (Visser, 1996). Hence Traxler labels the
Swedish system an organization-based regime. However, this self-
regulating capacity of labour market parties and the maintenance of a
relative balance of power between labour and capital require a strong
union movement capable of attracting and retaining a majority of the
work force as members. Under these conditions, resigning as union
member becomes a less attractive option, because in the end it would
weaken the bargaining capacity of the union movement. The high level of
unionization in Sweden has been attributed to the combination of cen-
tralized and decentralized organizational structures (Kjellberg, 1992) and
union involvement in the administration of unemployment insurance.
Unemployment in Sweden is provided by ‘benefit societies’ which are
financed from union membership contributions, employers’ fees and
public subsidies. Choice of scheme is voluntary, but is usually included
as part of union membership (Visser, 1996). Arguably, this system has
helped trade unions sustain membership growth, but also affects the
intention to resign. At the decentralized level, Sweden is a case of
workplace codetermination without works councils: arrangements are
exclusively union-based, with only union members eligible to vote for
and be elected workforce representatives. The 1976 Act on Co-
determination at Work gives these internal union bodies the possibility to
negotiate a wide range of participation rights, creating a unique
amalgamation of collective bargaining and second-channel ‘industrial
democracy’ (Rogers and Streeck, 1994). So from this perspective, becoming
and remaining a union member also has tangible advantages.
Together, these institutional features of the Swedish system may have
an important impact on the readiness of union members to resign. This
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mix of institutional features is absent in the other cases. This finding from
cross-national comparison implies that our hypotheses may only apply
to countries with less encompassing unions and extension-based
bargaining regimes (Traxler, 1998). Moreover, Sweden is distinct from the
other three countries from a social and economic policy perspective, with
its traditional commitment to full employment and the promotion of
active labour market policies. As a result, on a number of labour market
indicators its record is better than that of other market economies: high
participation rates (especially among women), low unemployment rates,
less than 10 percent of the jobless being unemployed for a year or longer
and a relatively small percentage of the total labour market budget spent
on ‘passive’ measures (Visser, 1996). Possibly, job insecurity has a dif-
ferent meaning to Swedes in comparison to Italian, Dutch and Belgian
employees.
Our results thus suggest that job insecurity can be accompanied by a
reduction in perceived union support and with the intention to resign
membership. Both conclusions correspond with the idea that union
members experience job insecurity as a violation of the psychological
contract with their union, resulting in negative consequences for the
union. This suggests that the introduction of psychological contract
theory in this study could constitute a fertile basis for further develop-
ment of theory and hypotheses in this domain. Members seem to view
the relationship with their union from a cost–benefit perspective, in
which they expect enough returns in exchange for their membership fee.
This opens new avenues for future research. First of all, it seems interest-
ing to explore the content of what members expect from their union, and
the way these expectations are balanced by their promises towards the
union. Research suggests that one can identify at least two kinds of
psychological contracts between employers and employees: transactional
and relational (Rousseau, 1990). Can one distinguish the same kinds of
psychological contracts with the union? Next, the issue of violation of
the psychological contract was especially relevant for our analysis of the
impact of job insecurity among union members. This issue has only been
analysed in a limited way in this study and several research questions
remain unanswered. If the psychological contract of union members
encompasses a larger range of expectations, then one could wonder
whether these are ordered according to some hierarchy: do members
require specific expectations to be fulfilled more urgently than others?
And how important is the issue of preventing job insecurity compared to
other expectations? What exactly do members expect in this respect: total
or sufficient security? Do they also extend their expectations to issues
such as fair treatment once the employing organization is faced with
restructuring or downsizing? And what are the behavioural conse-
quences of a perceived violation in the longer term? Do they really leave
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their union, or do feelings of insecurity ‘only’ affect their union
attitudes? Does job insecurity also affect other aspects of union partici-
pation – which Goslinga (2005), in a study of the consequences of job
insecurity, found was associated with perceived union support – such as
involvement in strikes and industrial action? These and related questions
should be explored in future research.
This study adds to previous research, and expands our knowledge of
the impact of job insecurity on union attitudes and behaviours in several
ways. First of all, the issue of job insecurity and its link with union
attitudes and behavioural intentions has not received much research
attention in the past. The application of psychological contract theory to
union membership is also innovative. This study is however not only
relevant from a theoretical point of view: the conclusions substantiate
that job insecurity is not only problematic for the individual employee or
the company, but also for trade unions. In three countries it seems to be
associated with a less favourable attitude towards unions and with an
intention to resign from membership. As indicated above, this might
threaten the power basis and strength of unions. The consequence of all
this is that unions need to pay specific attention to the issue of job
insecurity and its consequences (De Witte, 2005b; Sverke et al., 2004). The
negative consequences of job insecurity could be alleviated by extending
the package of services offered to members, and Goslinga (2005)
concluded that they can do so by offering information about job oppor-
tunities, the local labour market, and by providing career guidance and
advice. Such a package of services not only reduces the harmful effects of
insecurity for the well-being of individual members, but could also help in
reducing negative union attitudes and subsequent turnover intentions. Such
tasks will however also increase the workload of union activists and officials.
Some refinement is in order, however. This study only examined the
attitudes and intentions of union members. Job insecurity can, however,
also influence non-members. The latter can, for example, be prompted to
become a member because of job insecurity, which may compensate for
the exodus of union members. Since reactions of non-members to job
insecurity were not considered in this study, our comments on the
consequences for the unions are thus one-sided and incomplete. Future
research will have to analyse the impact of job insecurity on non-members
as well as members, before more definite conclusions can be drawn.
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